ANALYZING DUE PROCESS IN THE WORKPLACE
No representation of the world is either complete or permanent (Gerson, 1985) .
Rather, any description is a snapshot of historical processes, in which differing viewpoints, local contingencies, and multiple interests have been temporarily reconciled (Gerson and Star, 1985; Becker, 1982; . Kent (1978) (Hewitt, 1985; Gerson, 1984) . In the terminology developed by Hewitt and his associates to describe open systems, (Hewitt and de.Jong, 1983; 1984; Agha, 1985; Hewitt, 1984) workplace information systems thus require due process.
In the office, the due process prxam is this:
how can we assure that information systems make adequate provision for recognizing, weighing and evaluating alternatives from conflicting sources?
We call the work of ensuring due process articulation (Strauss, et al. 1984; Bendifallah and Scacchi, In Press; Fujimura, In Press) .
Articulation consists of all the tasks needed to coordinate a particular task, including scheduling sub-tasks, recovering from errors, and assembling resources. Articulation is a necessary part of due process because the definition of "adequate provision" shifts according to local circumstances. No matter how detailed requirements, they must be aligned with or tailored to a set of implementation conditions which cannot be fully specified ahead of time.
Standardized representations of office work and its products, as captured in forms, diagrams, databases, or narrative text, are thus the result of articulation, the local adjustments which made the work possible in practice. An adequate conceptual basis for the design and implementation of office information systems hence requires understanding the articulation by which these representations are created. Without an understanding of articulation, the gap between requirements and the actual work process in the office will remain inacessible to analysis.
That is, it will be possible to describe tasks in an idealized form, but not to describe actual situations. When the articulation of the work is deleted in representations of that work, the resulting task descriptions can only be uneasily superimposed on the flow of work. Eventually, the centralized processing system at PHU will evolve into one using many computers linked by some form of network.
It is certain that the network will not be wholly contained within PHU's organizational boundaries. "Contracting out" part of the data processing load is under active consideration by PHU's management, and providers are rapidly acquiring their own systems and pressing for the capacity to "hook up" directly with PHU's. The DP Department's de facto veto over certain kinds of operation will go away, and due process problems which are now handled at the inter-departmental level will become part of the day-to-day operations of the networked system. PHU is not alone in confronting this situation.
The continuing drop in computing costs and the corresponding increases in computing power mean that every organization can expect a similar set of arrangements to evolve.
In A different approach is thus necessary. The problem of due process in various forms has always been at the heart of social science research.
It thus seems a reasonable strategy to draw upon this accumulated expertise in formulating approaches to the due process problem as it appears in information systems.
In 1977, for example, Hewitt drew on the metaphor of the scientific community as an aid to conceptualizing systems which have no central authority, but which must nonetheless arrive at reliable answers to complex problems.
This metaphor was later elaborated to support conceptualization of the forerunners of the Apiary architecture (Kornfeld and Hewitt, 1981) . This approach led to a series of studies of scientific work organization (Star, 1983a; 1983b; 1984; 1985a; 1985b; Star and Gerson, submitted for publication; Gerson, 1984) .
Our approach to analysis of due process in open systems rests on a tradition of research on the professions and technical work organization (e.g. Becker, 1970; Becker, 1982; Kling and Scacchi, 1982; Bucher and Stelling, 1977; Gasser, 1984; Gerson, 1983; 1984; Hughes, 1970; Kling and Gerson, 1978a; 1978b; Scacchi, 1984a; 1984b; Scacchi, Gasser and Gerson, 1983; Strauss, 1975; . From this point of view, the due process problem consists of two aspects: understanding the role of local knowledge and the work of articulating all the contingencies which go into solving a problem. Similarly, Simon (1973) has noted that the ability to learn to articulate multiple illstructured problems is a sign of the "professional maturity" of the expert. But experts always work with others in complex organizational contexts.
Our approach differs from Simon's, and from the designers of rule-based expert systems who codify expert knowledge (this work is summarized in Hayes-Roth, et al., 1983) . These approaches seek to capture the process by which the single expert makes substantive or technical decisions.
Rut experts do not work in isolation; they must coordinate with one another. The development of methods for describing and analyzing tacit local knowledge has been a major thrust of recent work in the sociology of science (e.g. Law, 1985; forthcoming; Latour, forthcoming; Latour and Woolgar, 1979; Lynch, 1985; Collins, 1985; Star, 1983b; 1986 
